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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SHOULD
LEGISLATURES HAVE THE SUMMARY
POWER TO IMPRISON PERSONS
WITHOUT NOTICE OR A HEARING?*
I. INTRODUCTION
The power of American legislative bodies to punish for contempt
is derived primarily from the laws and customs of the English House of
Commons.' The power is exercised to vindicate traditional rights and
privileges claimed by legislatures and their members. 2 Whether the
House of Commons' power to punish for contempt, including the
power to imprison, is a valid precedent for legislatures in this country
has been seriously questioned in a leading Supreme Court case on the
grounds that the House of Commons was both a court and a legislative
body.3 Indeed, the House of Commons itself has taken both sides of the
question of whether it is a court,4 but it is certain that the House of
t Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1970), affdon rehearing. 436 F.2d 331
(7th Cir. 1971).
I. Po-rs, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (pts. 1-2), 74 U. PA.
L. REv. 691, 780 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Porrs].
2. Id. at 692-99.
Examples of the privileges that are claimed are freedom from arrest;
freedom of members from assaults, affronts, insults and libels; freedom of
legislatures as a whole from insults and libels; control of election of
members; and general inquisitorial powers.
Id. at 700-12.
3. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). In delivering the opinion of the
Court Mr. Justice Miller stated:
We are of the opinion that the right of the House of Representatives to
punish the citizen for a contempt of its authority or a breach of its
privileges can derive no support from the precedents and practices of the
two Houses of the English Parliament, nor from the adjudged cases in
which the English courts have upheld these practices.
Id. at 189. Yet, later in the opinion Mr. Justice Miller refuted his contention that the
House of Commons is a court when he quoted from the opinion of Mr. J.ustice
Cooleridge in Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad & E.I, 112 ENG. REP. 1112 (1839):
The House [of Commons] is not a court of law at all in the sense in which
that term can alone be properly applied here. Neither originally nor by
appeal can it decide a matter in litigation between two parties; it has no
means of doing so; it claims no such power; powers of inquiry and
accusation it has, but it decides nothing judically, except where it itself is a
party in the case of contempts.
Id. at 198.
4. Po-rs at 694-95.
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Commons possessed authority to punish directly for contempts without
the intervention of the courts, including the power to impose prolonged
terms of imprisonment.5
Prior to the adoption of our Federal Constitution, some states
enacted constitutional provisions which recognized in their legislatures
the power to find persons guilty of contempt committed in their
presence.' Notable examples are the early constitutions of
Massachusetts 7 and Maryland. In considering these state
constitutions, the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Gordon9
stated that the object of the provisions
could only have been to recognize the right of the legislative power
to deal with the particular acts without reference to their violation
of the criminal law and their susceptibility of being punished under
that law because of the necessity of such a legislative authority to
prevent or punish the acts independently, because of the
destruction of legislative power which would arise from such acts
if such authority was not possessed.' 0
Almost contemporaneously with the adoption of our Federal
Constitution similar provisions were written into many other state
constitutions." Thus, state legislative bodies have power to imprison
5. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521,533 (1917).
6. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis.2d 282, 292, 171 N.W.2d 192, 196 (1969).
7. MASS. CONST. part 2, chapter 1, § 3, art. 10 (1780) provides in part:
They [the house of representatives] shall have authority to punish by
imprisonment, every person, not a member, who shall be guilty of
disrespect to the House, by any disorderly, or contemptuous behavior, in
its presence ....
8. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 534 (1917), citing. MD. CONST. 1776, art. 12,
which provided in part:
That the house of delegates may punish by imprisonment, any person who
shall be guilty of a contempt in their view, by any disorderly or riotous
behavior, or by threats to, or abuse of their members, or by any
obstruction to their proceedings. ...
9. 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
10. Id. at 535-36.
II. Id. at 536, n.2, citing, inter alia. S.C. CONST., art. I § 13 (1790). The present
South Carolina constitution retains the original provision recognizing legislative
contempt power:
Each house may punish by imprisonment during its sitting any person not
a member who shall be guilty of disrespect to the house by any disorderly
or contemptuous behavior in its presence, or who, during the time of its
sitting, shall threaten harm to the body or estate of any member for
anything said or done in either house, or who shall assault any of them
therefor, or who shall assault or arrest any witness or other person ordered
[Vol. 23
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for contempts in their presence,' 2 either inherently, from the nature of
the body and the necessity for self-preservation, or by a constitutional
grant of power.' 3
Yet, no contempt power is expressly delegated by the Constitution,
except that given to the House and Senate to punish their own members
for disorderly behavior and other contempts. 4 Nevertheless, several
United States Supreme Court cases have held that Congress does have
limited implied powers over contempt. Anderson v. Dunn'5 was the first
such case to decide that from the power to legislate given by the
Constitution to Congress, there is also to be implied the power of
Congress to guard and preserve itself from contempts which were direct
obstructions to its legislative duties. 6 In Kilbourn v. Thompson 7 the
Court denied that Congress has similar judicial-legislative power of
contempt possessed by the House of Commons, but reserved the
question of whether implied authority to deal with contempts exists
incidental to the legislative power.'" The existence of an implied
legislative authority to deal with direct contempts was considered again
in In re Chapman and upheld. The scope of the implied power is
narrow, and is limited to punishment of acts which obstruct the
performance of legislative duties. 20 Legislative contempt power is
frequently exercised as a means to an end; for example, to prevent
recurrence of a legislative disturbance. But when a private citizen
obstructs the legislative process by his actions, he may be punished even
though the obstruction has been removed or removal is impossible; that
is, he may be punished for a past act.
2'
to attend the house in his going thereto or returning therefrom, or who
shall rescue any person arrested by order of the house: Provided, That such
time of imprisonment shall not in any case extend beyond the session of the
General Assembly.
S.C. CoNsT. art. 3, § 13.
12. See. e.g.. In re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155, 32 P. 470 (1893); Ex parte Dalton, 44 Ohio
St. 142. 5 N.E. 136 (1886); Exparte Parker, 74 S.C. 466, 55 S.E. 122 (1906); Canfield v.
Gresham. 82 Tex. 10, 17 S.W. 390 (1891).
13. Examples are set out at notes 7 & 8 supra.
14. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
15. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
16. Id. at 228. See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541-44 (1917).
17. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
18. Id. at 189.
19. 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
20. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147 (1935); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 232 (1821).
21. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147-48 (1935). The Court provides an
historical basis for its position:
1971]
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II. GROPPE v. LESLIE
Groppi v. Leslie," a case of first impression, presents the question
of whether the judicial power of summary punishment and
imprisonment for direct contempt is constitutionally exercisable by a
legislative body. On October 1, 1969, the Assembly, one of two houses
of the Wisconsin state legislature, passed a resolutionul finding Father
James E. Groppi in contempt for "disorderly conduct in the immediate
view of the house and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings". 2"
The Assembly resolution ordered Father Groppi imprisoned for the
duration of the regular session of the Wisconsin legislature, or for six
The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was
exerted as early as 1795, and since then has been exercised on several
occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution, by the colonial
assemblies, in imitation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards
by the Continental Congress and by state legislative bodies.
22. 436 F.2d 331 (1971).
23. The resolution reads:
1969 Spec. Sess. ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
Citing James E. Groppi for contempt of the Assembly and directing
his commitment to the Dane County jail.
In that James E. Groppi lead a gathering of people on September 29,
1969, which by its presence on the floor of the Assembly during a meeting
of the 1969 regular session of the Wisconsin Legislature in violation of
Assembly Rule 10 prevented the Assembly from conducting public
business and performing its constitutional duty; now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Assembly, That the Assembly finds that the above
cited action by James E. Groppi constituted 'disorderly conduct in the
immediate view of the house and directly tending to interrupt its
proceedings' and is an offense punishable as a contempt under Section
13.26(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes and Article IV, Section 8 of the
Wisconsin Constitution and therefore:
(1) Finds James E. Groppi guilty of contempt of the Assembly; and
(2) In accordance with Sections 13.26 and 13.27 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, orders the imprisonment of James E. Groppi for a period of 6
months, or for the duration of the 1969 regular session whichever is briefer,
in the Dane County jail and directs the sheriff of Dane County to seize said
person and deliver him to the jailer of the Dane County jail; and, be it
further
Resolved, That the Assembly directs that a copy of this resultion be
transmitted to the Dane County district attorney for further action by him
under Section 13.27(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes; and, be it further
Resolved, That the attorney general is respectfully requested to
represent the Assembly in any litigation arising herefrom.
Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 288-89, n.1, 171 N.W.2d 192, 194, n.j (1969). Pertinent
sections of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wisconsin statutes referred to in the
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months, whichever occurred earlier. Following adoption of the
Assembly resolution, a copy was 'served upon Groppi and he was
imprisoned in the Dane County Jail. He was given no notice ' or
specification of the charge against him, nor was any hearing held prior
to service of the copy upon him. His application for a'writ of habeas
corpus was denied by the circuit court for Dane County and again by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which held that the Assembly
exercised its contempt power validly in finding Groppi in contempt.ss
An order granting a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the federal
district court which held that Groppi had been denied procedural rights
guaranteed him by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2,6 The court concluded that "such punishment may not be
imposed by a legislature without at least providing the accused ,with
some minimal opportunity to appear and to respond to a charge", zY
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the federal
district court's order and held, on the factual basis presented,2 that a
legislature may properly punish summarily for contempt.1 On petition,
for rehearing en bane the court affirmed its prior decision. 3  .
ill. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Assembly action to punish Groppi for contempt was taken
25. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 300, 171 N.W.2d 192, 200 (1969).
26. Groppi v. Leslie, 311 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
27. Id. at 777.
28. Groppi's conduct which led to the Assembly resolution was stated in the opinion
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
On September 29, 1969, during a regular meeting of the Assembly just
prior to the commencement of a special session called by the governor,
James E. Groppi led a crowd of noisy protestors into the state capitol.
building and proceeded to "take over" the Assembly Chamber to protest
his disagreement with cutsin the state budget for certain welfare-programs.
The Assembly was unable to proceed with its legislative duties. We take
judicial notice that Groppi publicly stated in the Assembly tohis. cheering
supporters, in effect, that they had captured the capitol and intended to,
stay until they got what they wanted, and that Groppi yowed from -the
speaker's stand in the Assembly to remain there until, the legislature-
restored funds for welfare recipients. The occupation of the Assembly by
Groppi and the protestors lasted from approximately midday to well
toward midnight. Thereafter the protestors were kept out of the state
capitol building by police, sheriffs, and the national guard.
Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis, 2d 282,288, 171 N.W.2d 192, 194 (1969).
29. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 1970).
30. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 331, 332 (7th Cir. 1971).
1971]
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pursuant to article 4, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution3' and
sections 13.26(l)(b) and (2), and 13.27(1) of Wisconsin statutes.32 These
provisions are silent on procedural rules to be followed by the Houses
when punishing contempts. The question, therefore, arises whether
Groppi was denied due process of law when he was ordered imprisoned
for a maximum of six months, without formal charges, notice or
hearing, for his disorderly conduct in the immediate view of the House
and tending to interrupt its proceedings.
A. Contempt Powers of Courts vs. Legislatures
The answer, of course, reaches to the ultimate issue of whether the
judicial power of summary punishment for direct contempts is
constitutionally exercisable by a legislative body. Certainly the
Wisconsin Assembly has the authority' and the constitutional power3
to imprison a contemnor for contempt. Courts, as well, have the power
to punish for contempt, and, for direct contempts committed in the
presence of the court, the judge has the power to impose punishment
summarily, that is, without notice or a hearing." However, for a court
to exercise such power of summary contempt "the court-disturbing
misconduct must not only occur in the court's immediate presence, but
31. Wis. CONsT. art. 4, § 8 provides in part that "Each house may determine the
rules of its own proceedings, [and may] punish for contempt and disorderly
behavior ......
32. Wis. STAT. § 13.26 (l)(b), (2) (1955) provides:
(1) Each house may punish as a contempt, by imprisonment, a breach of
its privileges or the privileges of its members; but only for one or more of
the following offenses:
(b) Disorderly conduct in the immediate view of the house and directly
tending to interrupt its proceedings.
(2) The term of imprisonment a house may impose under this section shall
not extend beyond the same session of the legislature.
Wis. STAT. § 13.27(1) (1955) provides:
(I) Whenever either house of the legislature orders the impronment of any
person for contempt under s.13.26 such person shall be committed to the
Dane County jail, and the jailer shall receive such person and detain him in
close confinement for the term specified in the order of imprisonment,
unless he is sooner discharged by the order of such house or by due course
of law.
33. Id.
34. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935). A discussion of the
constitutionality of the power is contained in the introduction to this paper.
35. Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
[Vol. 23
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. . . the judge must have personal knowledge of it acquired by his own
observation of the contemptuous conduct".Y Except in the foregoing
narrowly limited category of contempts, a defendant charged with
contempt is entitled to notice of the charges, an opportunity'for a
hearing, and representation by counsel."
There are no reported historical precedents for the exercise of
summary contempt power by the legislature, nor are there any reported
decisions holding that the legislature does not have summary contempt
power.38 In the numerous state" and federal 0 cases where the
constitutionality of legislative power to punish for contempt has been
questiorled, the accused has had notice of the charge, and an
opportunity to appear before the house or senate to answer the charge
or to purge himself.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to analogize the judicial
power of courts to punish for direct contempt with the assembly's
summary action.' Instead, that court justified the exercise of summary
contempt power by the assembly on dual grounds; first, that legislative
bodies historically have had power to punish for contempt, and second,
that such actions of the legislature are reviewable by the courts and
subject to correction.' 2 After noting that Groppi had sought a hearing
only on issues that dealt primarily with procedure and not on the merits
of the contempt issue, the court concluded that
due process is satisfied when the courts are open to determine
promptly any question concerning the merits of a contempt found
36. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274-75 (1948), citing, Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925). The Court further specified that:
The narrow exception to ... due process requirements [of notice, hearing,
and right to counsel] includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in
the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of
the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, and
where immediate punishment is essential to prevent "demoralization of the
court's authority" before the public.
333 U.S. at 275.
37. See Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948);
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
38. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 1970).
39. Supra note 21.
40. See, e.g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
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to have been committed:by summary process before a legislature
for contempt committed in its presence.4
The federal district court did draw an analogy between courts and
legislatures, with, respect to their power to punish direct' contempts in
order to reach the constitutionality of the assembly's action. The court
first used the test enunciated in Oliver" to question "whether 'all of' the
essential elements of misconduct' [Groppi's acts on September 29]
occurred 'under the ee of' the members who voted affirmatively
October I and were 'actually observed' by those members,'" The
resolution ordering imprisonment and the records of the court
proceedings do, not indicate whether the acts of September 29 we q
observed by the October 1 voters,.- Thus, the Oliver test was lot met.'0
The court, while expressing skepticism as to the desirability of
recognizing summary contempt power even in the courts, distinguishes
between the preSentation of factual situations in courtrooms and
legislative chambers as a basis of denying extension of the judicial
contempt power to a legislature. The difference in physical contours
between most courts and legislative: chambers, and the improbability
that all members present in a legislative body would share a uniform
perception of an incident, led-the court to conclude that "the room for
error inherent in'the response of a large group is so great as to require
that-it observe some minimal procedures before it invokes [summary
contempt] power"." .... .
The'C6u t'of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected both
arguments advanced by the federal district court. In so doing, it relied
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision which stated that factual
matters such as erroneous perceptivity would be subject to review in the
state courts.' 8 In fact, Groppi had not sought a hearing in the
Wisconsin state courts or elsewhere on the merits of the contempt issue,
nor did he offer any defense or derial of the act cited in the resolution,
43. 44 Wis. 2d at 297, 171 N.W.2d at 198-90.
44. Supra note 36.
49., Groppi i. Leslie, 31 I'F. Supp.,772, 77" (W.D. Wis. 1970).
46. Id. The Oliver test is complemented by Rule 42(a) Federal Rtules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if a judge certifies that
-he saw or'heard the c6nduci constituting the contempt and 'that' it was
"committed in the actual presence of the court.'
47. Id. 'I; 6 -, i. 1970).
48.' Groppii v. Leslie,'436 F.2d 326, 330 (7th Cir. 1970).
[Vol., 23
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even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed Groppi to amend
his complaint to present any matters in issue. Therefore, the questions
concerning which of the assembly -members who voted for the
resolution had seen Groppi's acts two days earlier, and the factual basis
of perceptivity of witnesses were issues created by the federal district
court, and were not properly before the court on appeal. 9 For the
purpose of the-appeal the court considered only the bare allegations of
the resolution that Groppi led a gathering of people onto the floor of
the assembly and thereby prevented the assembly from conducting
public business.5 0 In holding that the legislature may properly punish
summarily for contempt the court reasoned that
[t]he court below was of the opinion that the minimal
requirements of procedural due process could be provided by the
legislature with little delay, presumably referring to a legislative
hearing . . . . [B]ut we cannot be unmindful of the protracted
nature of court proceedings which involve a cause celebre. The
courts . . . are essentially designed to devote the necessary time.
The legislature is not. . . . [C]onceivably a full legislative hearing
could cause the work of the body to grind to' a halt for several
weeks. We find such a contemplation intolerable on the American
scene.51
B. Due Process Requirements
It has been said that "due process of law" does not necessarily
mean a judicial hearing. 2 Due process need not fit a particular form or
follow a set procedural pattern; rather, due process need only protect
substantive rights. The Court in Cafeteria & Restaurant'Wor'kers Local
473 v. McElroy53 said thai consideration of what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise hature of the governmental function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.5 The Court in McElroy then held that the action
of the commander of a military installation revoking the security
clearance of the plaintiff-civilian, thus denying her access to her private
employment on the installation, did not violate due process, even
49. Id.
50. Id. at 328.
51. Id. at 328-29.
52. Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).
53. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
54. Id. at 895.
1971]
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though the petitioner was afforded no notice or hearing. :  However, an
important consideration for the Court in reaching this decision was the
fact that the petitioner was free to find employment elsewhere. And in
Hannah v. Larche5 ' the Court said that "[d]ue process is an elusive
concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its concept varies
according to specific factual contexts." 5 Thus, when a government
agency adjudication or ruling directly affects the legal rights of an
individual, the agency must use procedures which traditionally have
been associated with judicial due process." But whether a specific right
prevails in a given proceeding depends on many factors. Consideration
must be given to the nature of the alleged rights involved, the nature of
the proceeding, the resulting benefits to the indivual, and the possible
burdens to the proceedings. 9 In Jenkins v. McKeithen a case
concerning the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute creating the
Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry, the Court held that the
right to cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect of procedural
due process."' In the factual context presented, where the Commission
allegedly finds a person guilty of a crime due process requires that the
person being investigated have the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him.62 In a petition seeking habeas corpus, the court
in Kritsby v. McGinnis'3 held that a hearing held about ten days
following a prison protest with only the prisoner and principal keeper
as. disciplinary authority and judge, allegedly resulting in summary
disposition, denied the prisoner his right to due process. Thus, a
hearing, to accord with due process, must be given at a meaningful time
arid in a meaningful manner." And the right to be heard before being
condemned to stiffer grievous loss of any kind has been characterized as
a principle of our society."
55. Id. at 898-99,
56. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
57. Id. at 442.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 395 U.S.411 (1969).
61. Id. at 428.
62. Id.. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which held that the sixth
amendment's right of aii accused to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental
right and is made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment.
63. 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. N.Y. 1970).
64. Armstrong v. Mhnzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
65. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951),
[Vol. 23
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It would seem that the foregoing authorities would support the
federal district court's reasoning and conclusion that the legislature
should not have punished Groppi without first according him some
minimal opportunity to appear and to respond to a charge. But the
Wisconsin Supreme Court classified the legislative power of contempt
as more in the nature of a civil contempt."0 The implication is apparent
from the court decision that traditional judicial due process, including
the right to notice and a hearing, would not be mandatory. However,
both the federal district court 7 and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit" differed with the state court and recognized that
legislatures do impose sanctions for the purpose of punishing for a past
deed as well as for preventing further obstructions to legislative
functions. The former is the same objective found in punishing for most
crimes, and a direct obstruction to the legislative process would be a
criminal contempt. In reaching its decision in Bloom v. Illinois9 the
United States Supreme Court declared that "criminal contempt is a
crime in the ordinary sense". 7 The Court held in Bloom that the
Constitution is properly to be construed as guaranteeing a right to jury
trial in state court prosecutions for serious criminal contempts.7'
Despite the fact that Groppi's disruption of the Wisconsin Assembly
was a criminal contempt, he is not entitled to jury trial pursuant to
Bloom as the punishment provided for in the resolution could not in
any event have exceeded six months.7 1 It should be noted that the
Bloom decision appears to conflict with Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.7 3 However, the Court implied that all
contempts for disorder in a courtroom would be petty crimes, which
are not entitled to jury trials. 74 But whether disorders "under the eye of
the court" are always petty offenses is yet to be decided.
66. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 296, 171 N.W.2d 192, 198 (1969).
67. 311 F. Supp. at 780.
68. 436 F.2d at 329.
69. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Bloom was charged with contempt of court for filing a
spurious will for probate. Bloom's request for jury trial was denied, he was found guilty
of criminal contempt, and sentenced to imprisonment for 24 months.
70. Id. at 201.
71. Id. at 198. See Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that "the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to jury trial in all criminal cases which-were
they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee." Id. at 149.
72. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 326, 330 (7th Cir. 1970); Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d
282, 298, 171 N.W.2d 192, 199 (1969).
73. Supra note 46.
74. 391 U.S. at 210.
1971]
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Ill. CONCLUSION
Whether Groppi should be accorded due process in the form of
rights to notice, a hearing, counsel and confrontation of witness as is
customarily given an accused in a criminal action will remain an open
question until decided by the United States Supreme Court. The
Groppi case is unique, as demonstrated by the lack of authority either
sustaining or denying summary contempt power to legislatures. This is
also suggested by the fact that
instances of leading a gathering of people on to the floor of
legislative halls and preventing the legislature from conducting
public business are extremely rare if not virtually non-existent to
this time in the United States2
If it is conceded that a legislature has power similar to that of the
courts to punish summarily for direct contempts, the recent decision of
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania"5 may support Groppi's contention that he is
entitled to some minimal opportunity to appear at a separate hearing.
In Mayberry a Pennsylvania criminal defendant, who repeatedly
insulted and vilified the trial judge and disrupted courtroom
proceedings, and who was found guilty of the criminal charge against
him on a Friday, was summarily sentenced by the trial judge to eleven
to twenty-two years imprisonment for contempt on the following
Monday during imposition of sentence for the criminal offense. The
United States Supreme Court held that by reason of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, a defendant in a criminal
contempt of court proceeding should be given a public trial before a
judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.
The question of whether Groppi is entitled to a hearing simply
provokes the rhetorical question of "what is there tohear?" Groppi did
not deny that his acts were contemptuous or that he did in fact obstruct
the legislature, even when given such an opportunity in the state courts.
The rationale of the court of appeals in reaching its decision on the
narrow issue involving direct interference with "conducting public
business" in "the immediate view of the legislative body" was cogently
expressed:
We share the laudable concern of the district court for the full
protection of procedural rights guaranteed to the individual by the
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In essence,
however, we have in the case before us a situation in which we
must balance claimed constitutional procedural rights of the
individual citizen against the welfare of the citizenry as a whole.
We find the scales weighted in favor of the citizenry. In so doing
we do not feel we are adopting an alarmist view in recognizing
validity in the respondent's position that protracted and frequent
legislative trials, if necessary, could easily and realistically become
a favorite tool in the politics of confrontation and obstruction, and
representative government (whatever its present faults) would go
down to defeat.
We reach with some reluctance any decision which appears even
remotely to achieve an eroding effect on basic civil liberties as
guaranteed by our constitution; but believing, as we do, that illegal
and physically forcible interference with properly functioning
governmental institutions would pose the real risk of being
eventually accompanied by the abolition, rather than the erosion,
of the individual constitutional liberties, we are unable to reach
any other result in the case before us.
77
For the reasons expressed, the decision of the court of appeals
holding that the legislature may constitutionally exercise the judicial
power of summary contempt over direct contempts should be affirmed
if certiorari is granted by the United States Supreme Court.
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